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PROPOSED NUCLEAR
LEGISLATION-SHORTENING THE LEAD
TIME
Harry H. Voigt*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Beckjord has done a nice job of introducing and scoping the
problem of nuclear licensing, however, I do want to make one preliminary point. Even though the result of the numerous delays in the licensing and construction of nuclear plans may be to double the capital
cost of the plant, there is widespread agreement that nevertheless the
electricity produced from a nuclear plant is and will be cheaper than
electricity from a new coal-fired plant. This is because even though a
nuclear plant costs a lot more to build, uranium is still much, much
cheaper than coal, particularly if the costs of some of the newly-emerging environmental constraints on the production and use of coal are
considered. Consequently, from an economic standpoint, nuclear
power does remain an exceedingly viable alternative, even if we cannot
solve all of the problems that are leading to long delays and resulting in
higher capital charges.
II.

ADMINISTRATION LICENSING REFORM

I would like to give you a brief overview of the Administration's
proposal to address some of these problems, and then to comment on
the ways in which the process might be improved above and beyond
what the Administration proposes. The Administration has been
working on the reform of nuclear licensing for about nine months.
* LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, Washington, D.C.; A.B. cum laude, Miami University,
1953; LL.B. cum laude, New York University, 1956. Public Member, Administrative Conference

of the United States, 1974-present. Assistant to the Chairman, Federal Power Commission, 197072.
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During the course of that time, we have seen at least eight drafts of
proposed legislation. The Administration's bill was finally introduced
on March 21, 1978.1 The basic tenet of the proposed legislation is a
requirement that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission set up a system
for open and advanced planning, including public participation, for future nuclear power plans.2 It is worth noting that this requirement
would only apply to nuclear plants and not to coal or other possible
competing methods of generation, and it is clear that, if imposed, it
would add another segment of time onto the front end of the licensing
process.

The bill as proposed does permit the granting of a combined construction permit and operating license.' It also contains a provision
permitting the Commission to authorize utilities to commence certain
forms of construction on the site even before a license is issued.4 A
separate provision is made to enable a utility that wishes to do so to
gain approval for a site before it has actually selected a particular plant
to build on this site and made a formal license application. Unfortunately, the bill also requires a finding of a "generic future need for
electric power" in connection with the approval of the site at an early
time.5 If this is intended simply to require a finding that someone,
somewhere, someday is going to need more electricity, it is meaningless. If, on the other hand, someone must foretell fifteen or twenty
years in advance whether it may be necessary to supply power from
that site, the requirement is totally unrealistic.6 It would be better to
permit the selection and certification of suitable sites without reference
to any need for power, leaving that issue to be decided as the time to
actually build a plant approaches. The bill also contains provisions for
the approval of standardized plant designs and for so-called manufacturing licenses to produce plants in a manufacturing environment, so
you have them coming off the assembly line.7

The Administration bill not only preserves much of the existing
hearing scheme, but it would appear to expand it. It provides for a
1. H.R. 11704 and S.2775, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978). A section-by-section analysis of the
Administration's bill appears in 124 CONG. REc. 4265-70 (1978).
2. Id. § 101. Section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to H.R. 11704, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978). The section numbers and content of S. 2775 are identical.
3. Id. at § 102.
4. Id.
5. Id. at § 105.
6. Cf. A. MuRPHY, D. LA PIERRE & N. ORLOFF, THE LICENSING OF POWER PLANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 69 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MuRPHY STUDY].
7. See H.R. 11704, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 106 (1978).
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mandatory hearing to be provided, even though nobody wants one, at
least three stages, the combined construction permit and operating license application, the site approval, and the approval of a standardized
design for a plant.8 In addition, numerous other opportunities for a
hearing on request are provided. Such hearings include a hearing on
the granting of a construction permit, if applied for separately from the
operating license, a second hearing for the operating license, a third
hearing for the authorization to commence site preparation or early
construction. There is an opportunity for a hearing on each and every
license amendment, and similarly an opportunity for a hearing on the
amendment of a site approval previously granted or a standard design
previously approved.
The bill includes specific provisions for interim operating authority where a plant is being held up because of the hearing process.9 In
the case of an interim operating license, the bill as written would require a finding of "urgent public need or emergency." This I view as
going beyond a simple finding of economics or benefits to the consumer, and thus perpetuating the present situation where a plant can be
held up, even though it is clearly economical and beneficial for the
public for it to begin operating.
Another difficulty with the proposed interim operating authority is
that it requires the Commission itself to conduct a hearing and make
findings. Obviously, the members of the Commission have a great
many other matters on their minds, and one wonders how easy it will
be to get all five of them to sit down and take a couple of weeks to hold
a hearing to determine whether there is one of these emergencies. The
good part is that the interim operating authority could be conferred
based on informal procedure, but it would be limited to twelve months,
subject to extension.
The bill addresses what is probably the most critical problem in
licensing today, the interplay between the states and the federal government. It would give new authority to the states to certify the need for
the facility, if there is an authority within the state authorized under
state law to make such a certification.' 0 The state could also elect to
determine the need for power and the environmental acceptability of a
plant or a site. Those determinations, if the state has a program which
met certain prerequisites and has been approved by the federal govern8. Id. at § 103.
9. Id. at § 104.
10. Id. at §§ 102, 202.
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ment, would be binding upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and, theoretically at least, would cut down on both the scope and
length of the federal review. There is, however, no provision in the
draft legislation for putting any time limit on how long a state would
have to perform its certification responsibilities." Assuming that a
state does not have a federally approved program, it may still under the
proposed legislation make findings, but these would not be binding on
the federal government and would be subject to further review. In
either case, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would retain exclusive
jurisdiction over all aspects of radiological health and safety, and the
environmental effects of radiation would not be open to inquiry by the
states. So there is an effort here to separate out and say the states will
do this, and the federal government will retain that, but it is not clear
exactly how some of these separate determinations are doing to interface.
The bill would further provide for intervention funding in all
Commission proceedings, although the NRC would retain the discretion as to whether it would provide the funding for intervenors in

rulemaking.
III.

PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS

Now let me list some ways in which the Administration's proposed
legislation might be improved. First, the provisions for federally controlled advanced planning should be eliminated. If a state desires to
have advance planning, that should be the state's option. If the state
does not want it, there is no real reason for the federal government to
impose it. Second, mandatory hearings today really do not make any
sense. 12 They date back to twenty years ago, when Congress wanted to
educate the public about nuclear power. It may have been a good idea
at the time, but clearly the climate has changed, and there is no particular purpose in having a mandatory hearing today. Further, a hearing,
if held, should be strictly limited to those issues on which someone
wants a hearing, and if there is an intervention granted on one issue, let
the hearings be limited to that one issue, and let the other matters in the
application be disposed of by NRC staff review.
In addition, I submit that there must be only one opportunity for a
hearing on any single set of issues. For example, once a site has been
determined to be a suitable one, that ought to be the end of it, and one
11. Id.
12. See MURPHY STuDY, supra note 6, at 51-52.
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ought not to be able to litigate the suitability of the site over and over
again: This could be accomplished by delegating site suitability to the
state, and making the state determination binding, or by letting the
state make certain findings, and then have them be conclusory in any
subsequent federal proceedings.
With respect to the approval of standard designs, the proposed legislation looks toward rulemaking on a standard design, but an adjudicatory hearing on a manufacturing license. The only reason I can
think of for this is that this is the way it is being done now' 3 but clearly
if a rulemaking hearing is good enough for a standardized design, it
ought also to be good enough for a manufacturing license.
It should be recognized that adjudicatory hearings are part of the
American tradition, and I think they serve a useful purpose and so
would provide one opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing. That
hearing ought to be on the general subject of site suitability, because
that is what most people are really concerned about and what they
want to hear about. The technical design issues of a nuclear plant are
simply too complicated for the average person to get deeply involved it.
The real issue in most of these hearings is "I don't want it in my back
yard," so let us have an adjudicatory hearing on site suitability, and let
the public have a chance to have its say on that issue. If site suitability
has not previously been determined, then the adjudicatory hearing
would be on the construction permit. I can see no policy reason for
any hearings after that time. One can get a federal license to build a
big dam which, if it breaks, is likely to kill a lot more people in certain
settings than a nuclear plant, and there is no requirement for another
hearing. One can go and get a license to build an LNG plant that
could blow up, and there is never another hearing. Once a utility is
given a license to build a nuclear plant, it should be up to the federal
inspectors and regulators to see that it is built right. A nuclear plant is
the only instrumentality that is licensed where you have to come back
and have a second hearing before you can operate. It is very difficult
in my mind to justify this.' 4 The second hearing has been a source of
delay in many cases and tremendous expense because the plant is already built, it is ready to run, so why hold it up at that point. The
go/no go decision has to be made at the beginning, and once it has
been made, I believe there should be no further opportunity for public
hearings.
13. See 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. M (1977).
14.

See MURPHY STuDy, supra note 6, at 30.
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Now let me briefly talk about the federal/state division of responsibilities. As I have indicated, this is probably the most difficult area
that we as a nation have to address and try to solve. There are a
number of ways that it can be done. One is to give each state exclusive
jurisdiction to determine local things, such as the need for power within
the state, the best way to get the power, and the best place to put the
plant. It is possible to do this by setting up a system similar to that
which we now have under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
under which the state is required to give a certificate before one can get
a federal license, the state having one year in which to so certify, and if
the certificate is not given within a year, it is waived. Maybe we could
work something out along those lines that would give the states the
opportunity to make a binding certificate to the federal government. A
second possibility is to give everything that does not have to do with
nuclear safety to the states, and let them do their own thing. A third
possibility is to go completely to the other side of the scale and preempt
everything and let the NRC or the Department of Energy make all of
the determinations, completely freezing the states out of the process. A
fourth possibility, which is where the Administration bill seems to be
heading, is to create an Air Act or Water Act type of regime where the
federal government sets up certain standards, the state has to show that
its program complies with those standards, and having done so, it then
acquires the authority to control certain parts of the process. The only
difficulty with that is that in the bill right now there are no efficiency
standards. Further, there is no contemplation of efficiency standards.
So the state could create a program that might take four or five or six
years. I suggest that if we are going to have a state/federal combined
program, there ought to be time limits and efficiency standards before a
state can qualify.
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